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Trends in Communist Propaganda

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1 of 1

TCP 46-74

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
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE:

Moscow Ideological Drive Undercuts Detente Foes

Confidential

13 NOVEMBER 1974
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FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

CONTENTS

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Schlesinger Targeting Doctrine Seen as Inimical to Detente 1

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PRC Anniversary Message Shows Altered Border Stance 3

ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR Links Israeli Economic Ills, "Reckless" Foreign Policy 6

INDOCHINA

GVN Call for Resumption of Talks Draws Negative PRG, DRV Response . . . 8

DRV Signs Economic Agreements With East European Delegations 9

KOREA

DPRK Foreign Minister Indicates Change in Negotiation Terms 11

PRC-CARIBBEAN

Peking Welcomes Trinidad Guest, Praises Guyana Policies 13

CHINA

RED FLAG Articles Urge Discipline, Warn of Factionalism 14

NOTES

Cambodian National Day; DPRK-Soviet Relations;
Argentine State of Siege; Belgrade on Sino-Soviet Ties 16

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: New Moscow Ideological Drive Appears
to Undercut Detente Foes S1

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics i

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 1 -

U. S. -- SOVIET RELATIONS

SCHLESINGER TARGETING DOCTRINE SEEN AS INIMICAL TO DETENTE

In the most extensive Soviet comment to date on the ideas about selective nuclear missile targeting and flexible options advanced by U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger at the turn of the year, USA Institute specialists M. A. Milshteyn and L. S. Semeyko describe the proposals as a revival of shopworn American ideas aimed at making nuclear war acceptable. Writing in the November issue of the journal USA (No. 11), the authors adduce the familiar arguments against these ideas that have been advanced previously in U.S. and European press discussions--stressing the argument that the requirements for enhanced accuracy, war-head numbers, etc., would lead to a step-up in the arms race. Understandably, they do not seek to rebut but merely deride the main point of the Schlesinger concept--the contention that the availability of options for a limited response to a nuclear threat would enhance the credibility of the U.S. strategic posture, and hence the stability of deterrence.

CONFLICTS IN U.S. POLICY The authors place the Schlesinger concept in the historical line of American strategic thought which, they say, has focused on the search for ways to make nuclear weapons useable. While acknowledging that a realistic appreciation of the unacceptability of nuclear war has been widely accepted in the United States, they say that this acceptance is still not complete, and that official policy is still subject to a "certain inconsistency" and "dangerous zig-zags" which "contradict positions which have already been asserted and have become one of the bases of detente." In what is no doubt an elliptical reference to the asserted Schlesinger-Kissinger conflict, they say that the question of whether nuclear arms can be used is one of the main issues around which "various forces are struggling" in the U.S. Government.

Asserting that until recently the main aim of U.S. strategic thought has been to devise a war-winning or war-surviving strategy, they say that a more realistic attitude was brought about only by the change in the strategic balance which was registered in the 1973 Summit agreement banning nuclear war. Apparently conceding that the concept of "assured destruction" still underlies the present detente relationship, the authors seem to imply that the strategic underpinnings of the relationship are now less important than the political arrangements governing detente. In any event, the Schlesinger concepts are seen to be inconsistent with both, since they assertedly reopen the door to the use of nuclear weapons in direct conflicts between the two powers.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 2 -

Directly contesting the asserted claim that a limited and selective use of nuclear weapons could prevent unlimited nuclear war, the authors argue that the likely outcome would be rapid escalation. Moreover, they dispute the feasibility of limited nuclear strikes in any event, pointing out that damage to civilian targets would be almost inevitable. Finally, they adduce West European opinion in support of these arguments, noting that West European are not particularly reassured by the Schlesinger concept, since it includes no provision for protecting European cities from destruction.

POLITICAL The authors' main arguments against the concept
IMPLICATIONS are directed at its political implications rather
 than at its theoretical practicality as a strategic
scenario. On this level, the Schlesinger ideas are seen as having
a potential deleterious impact on the current detente atmosphere, as
well as on the longer range relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union. The main concern expressed by the authors is that
the requirements for enhanced accuracy, increased warhead numbers, etc.,
implied by the selective targeting strategy would lead to an escalation
of the arms race in its most dangerous sphere--the "qualitative"
one. Along with this, they stress the destabilizing implications
of the posture implied by the concept, which would include the
capability for highly accurate strikes on military targets. Finally,
they point out that all of this runs "counter to the line toward
strategic arms limitation."

While carefully avoiding the implication that this necessarily
reflects the considered policy of the U.S. Government, they stress
that these trends in U.S. strategy "can only complicate the already
highly complex process of military-political detente."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 3 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PRC ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE SHOWS ALTERED BORDER STANCE

Peking has added new elements to its public position on a Sino-Soviet border agreement, claiming that a "mutual understanding" reached at the September 1969 Kosygin-Chou meeting in Peking provided for mutual nonaggression and nonuse of force as part of a preliminary package accord to be reached before starting overall border negotiations. The new Chinese elaboration, contained in the traditional 6 November message from the PRC National People's Congress and State Council to their Soviet counterparts on the anniversary of the October Revolution, serves to counter Moscow's claims of Peking's intransigence and give the appearance of Chinese flexibility. This seems particularly significant coming on the eve of the Brezhnev-Ford Vladivostok meeting and Secretary Kissinger's trip to China.

Moscow has claimed that it initially offered Peking a draft treaty on the nonuse of force on 15 January 1971 and a draft nonaggression treaty on 14 June 1973, but was rebuffed on both occasions. This year's 30 September Soviet greetings on PRC National Day reiterated Moscow's continued desire to conclude such pacts with Peking. The current Chinese message implies that such proposals add nothing to the original "understanding," which it claims linked nonaggression and nonuse of force provisions with the longstanding Chinese demand that the Soviets agree to withdraw forces from disputed areas along the border--a step Moscow has thus far shown no willingness to take. The message stated that prior to an overall negotiated settlement of border questions, "it is necessary to conclude an agreement on mutual nonaggression and nonuse of force against one another, on maintaining the status quo on the border, and on averting armed conflicts and withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides from disputed areas."

The current Chinese position still leaves unchanged basic Sino-Soviet disagreement over "withdrawal of forces from disputed areas." Prominent Soviet Foreign Ministry Chinese affairs officer M.S. Kapitsa charged in an August 1974 article in PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST that Peking, "under the guise of invented 'disputed regions,'" had been blocking progress in the border talks for the last five years. Chou En-lai, according to the New York TIMES of 26 October 1973, said that despite his agreement with Kosygin, the Russians subsequently have even refused to recognize "objective facts like the existence of disputed areas."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 4 -

Apart from its border statement, the PRC message followed the pattern of last year's moderate Chinese greetings, stressing the friendship of the Chinese and Soviet "peoples" and affirming that disputes of principle between the two sides should not hinder normalization of state relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Like last year, the new message thus far has not been carried by any of the NCNA transmissions, but only by Radio Peking in Russian and a number of other foreign languages. (Last year's was heard only on Peking's Russian service.) The 1973 message had included the first specific reference to the border issue in a Peking anniversary greeting, reiterating the PRC call to solve the question through peaceful negotiations "under conditions which exclude any threat." The 1973 message preceded by four days the arrival of Secretary Kissinger on his last trip to Peking for talks on Sino-U.S. relations.*

BACKGROUND ON
BORDER STANCE

The Chinese message marks the first PRC media acknowledgment that an understanding had been reached during the September 1969 Chou-Kosygin meeting, although a PRC-inspired report in the Hong Kong Communist daily TA KUNG PAO in January 1970 and subsequent Chinese officials' remarks to Western newsmen--including Chou En-lai's 26 October 1973 interview with the New York TIMES--have referred to a Chou-Kosygin agreement. These reports, as well as official Chinese statements issued at the start of the border talks in October 1969, had not mentioned nonaggression or nonuse of force but asserted that the three conditions regarding the border status quo, avoiding armed clashes, and withdrawal of forces from disputed areas should be met pending an overall negotiated border settlement.

Peking's new stance comes in the wake of frequently strident Chinese criticism in recent years of Moscow's advocacy of the principle of nonuse of force in international relations. PRC UN delegate Ling Ching on 20 November 1973 went so far as to launch a thinly veiled attack on Soviet intentions in proposing nonuse of force to China. He said that Moscow, "while undisguisedly stationing a million troops on the borders of a neighboring country for blatant military threats, keeps on proclaiming that it 'has no intention at all to make threats' and has even hypocritically proposed the nonuse of force against each other, falsely accusing others of being 'expansionist' and 'warlike.'"

* The 1973 PRC message is discussed in the TRENDS of 7 November 1973, page 22.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 5 -

SOVIET REACTION Monitored Soviet media are not known to have mentioned the passage on the new Chinese border stance. While last year PRAVDA published the full text of the Chinese greetings, this year the paper glossed over the passage dealing with the border in reporting the PRC greetings, stating on the 9th that it "sets forth the PRC Government's well-known position on questions of Soviet-Chinese relations." Like Peking, Moscow has continued a normal level of sharp polemics against its adversary, with a 9 November Molin commentary on Moscow's Mandarin service denouncing the Maoist leaders' refusal to tell the Chinese people of Moscow's "constructive proposals" for normalizing relations but avoiding reference to nonuse of force or nonaggression pacts.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 6 -

ARAB - ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR LINKS ISRAELI ECONOMIC ILLS: "RECKLESS" FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow comment on the Israeli Government's 10 November decision to institute new economic austerity measures has typically emphasized that Israel's severe economic problems are the price its citizens must pay for their government's large-scale military expenditures. Focusing primarily on this causal relationship, a number of TASS items reported details of the new measures--chiefly, a currency devaluation along with supplementary measures such as reduced government spending and selectively restricted imports, announced by Israeli Finance Minister Rabinowitz as designed to increase Israel's foreign currency reserves. Describing the measures as "austerity at the expense of the working people" and "genuine disaster for the man in the street," the TASS items stressed that public disorders and protests had occurred in several Israeli cities over the practical effects of the new measures, particularly over an anticipated sharp increase in the cost of living, reductions in public services, and restrictions on wage demands.

At the same time, Moscow media have used the recent economic developments in Israel as a peg for repeating standard Soviet criticisms of Tel Aviv's Middle East policies. For instance, a PRAVDA article by Vladimir Peresada reported by TASS on the 11th pointed to Israel's "lack of interest" in a political settlement as indicated by its decision to rely on emergency economic measures, while laying out "enormous funds for buying offensive weapons and staging military exercises." Peresada asserted that previous austerity programs had not improved Israel's economic situation and that increasing numbers of Israeli citizens were beginning to realize that their economic difficulties could be traced to a "reckless foreign policy."

Soviet comment has also linked the new Israeli economic measures to the 26-29 October Arab summit conference at Rabat, asserting that it stimulated Israeli demands for increased U.S. weapons. TASS commentator Sergey Bulantsev on the 12th, for example, claimed that after the Rabat conference U.S. circles noted that Israel's requests for arms had escalated sharply, calling not only for more arms but for faster deliveries of the latest weapons, specifically laser-guided missiles that are only now being delivered to U.S. military units. Bulantsev also referred to Israeli Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 7 -

Rabin's September visit to the United States and his request then for additional U.S. military assistance, citing past and future such aid as "evidence of Tel Aviv's enormous military appetite."

Bulantsev in a TASS commentary the previous day had rejected an "untruthful" and "unfounded" allegation, which he attributed to a U.S. Congressman visiting Israel, that the Soviet army prior to the October 1973 Mideast war had provided Arab armies with a "huge quantity of chemical, bacteriological and radioactive materials." Soviet references to CW and BW weaponry in the Middle East are unusual in any context. Bulantsev went on to assert that such "inventions" were aimed at providing a pretext for increasing U.S. military deliveries to Israel.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 8 -

INDOCHINA

GVN CALL FOR RESUMPTION OF TALKS DRAWS NEGATIVE PRG, DRV RESPONSE

The 7 November GVN declaration which condemned the communists for disregarding the Paris agreement and called for resumption of negotiations at La Celle-Saint-Cloud without preconditions has drawn sharp reaction from the PRG and DRV. Vietnamese communist media have countercharged that it is the GVN which is violating the peace agreement and have taken the occasion to reiterate the PRG's recent stand that it will not negotiate with the GVN until Thieu has been removed from office. This stand had been first voiced authoritatively in a government statement issued by the PRG on 8 October endorsing earlier low-level demands for Thieu's ouster.*

In a statement issued by the PRG delegation to the La Celle-Saint-Cloud consultative conference on 9 November, the GVN's demand for resumption of negotiations and what is termed "Washington's approval of that deceitful statement" were disdainfully characterized as attempts to cope with the urban "struggle movement" in the South and with the 8 October PRG statement. While averring the communists' "goodwill" for entering into negotiations, the delegation statement reiterated the PRG line that Thieu must first be toppled and an administration "desiring peace and concord and willing to scrupulously implement the Paris agreement" be set up before talks could take place. In an apparent effort to forestall further criticism of its call for Thieu's dismissal as a violation of the Paris agreement itself and to impart an aura of legality to its stance, the delegation statement acknowledged PRG recognition of two administrations in South Vietnam and made clear that its quarrel was but with Thieu and "his gang."

An 11 November Liberation Radio commentary, citing what it described as a "massacre" that occurred in the hamlet of Chinh Tam on the 2d and subsequent "threats" from Thieu, declared that the GVN proposal for negotiations was "nothing but a trick" and an attempt to "divert the struggle . . . of urban compatriots." Recalling events that led to the cessation of talks at La Celle-Saint-Cloud, the commentary claimed that Thieu on 16 April "used" the Tong Le Cham incident as a pretext to indefinitely suspend the conference. But Liberation Radio failed to mention that the PRG itself had in effect endorsed the rupture in negotiations with its own later announcement on 13 May of indefinite suspension of talks.**

* For a discussion of the PRG statement, see the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 11-12.

** See the TRENDS of 15 May 1974, pages 9-10 for a discussion of the PRG suspension of bilateral negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 9 -

DRV comment on the GVN call for a resumption of negotiations has consisted of a NHAN DAN article on 11 November and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of the 10th, both fully supporting the PRG refusal to negotiate with Thieu's representatives.

DRV SIGNS ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WITH EAST EUROPEAN DELEGATIONS

Agreements on "economic, scientific and technical cooperation" and "goods exchange" for 1975 were signed in Hanoi during late October and early November by the DRV and visiting economic delegations from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany. There has been no clear indication from Eastern European or Vietnamese media reports whether the usual annual economic aid provisions were included in the cooperation and trade documents or whether separate aid agreements for 1975 remain to be negotiated. Similarly described agreements on cooperation and trade for 1975, signed by the DRV and Bulgaria on 1 March 1974, were followed six months later by a 1975 economic aid agreement, concluded by the DRV delegation to Bulgaria's National Day celebrations in Sofia on 14 September 1974. Other 1975 aid agreements known to have been concluded include a nonrefundable economic aid agreement with Albania, signed in Hanoi on 7 October, and an economic and military aid agreement with China, signed in Peking on 26 October 1974. Mongolian economic aid for both 1974 and 1975 was provided for in the agreement signed in Ulan Bator on 25 June 1973. By this time last year, Hanoi had already concluded economic aid agreements for the next year with all its communist allies.

Hanoi VNA reports on each of the recent signing ceremonies in Hanoi used identical language to describe the agreements and made no mention of "aid," but other Vietnamese and East European media reports and comment on the economic missions to the DRV employed different characterizations, making it difficult to determine the exact nature of the agreements. Thus the DRV-CSSR agreements, signed on 27 October by Vice Premier Dang Viet Chau and CSSR Vice Premier Jan Gregor, were characterized in a 28 October NHAN DAN article, carried by VNA, as including "documents on economic aid and goods exchange for 1975" and an agreement on "scientific and technical cooperation," while Prague Domestic Service reported on 28 October that there were protocols on "trade and payments for 1975" and on "scientific and technical cooperation."

The specific nature of the Hungarian-DRV agreements, signed on 4 November by Vice Premier Phan Trong Tue and Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers Janos Borbandi, was also unclear from Vietnamese and Hungarian media reports. Budapest MTI carried a 4 November report on the signing of agreements on "economic cooperation and aid as well as

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 10 -

the 1975 exchange of goods" while a 5 November NHAN DAN article, carried by VNA, referred only to documents "promoting cooperation and mutual assistance" in "economy, science, technology, and culture."

The agreements with East Germany, signed on 11 November by Vice Premier Phan Trong Tue and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Gerhard Weiss, were described in a 12 November NHAN DAN article as a "new manifestation of continuing GDR assistance" to Vietnam. According to the paper, this "cooperation and mutual assistance," particularly the "GDR's experience in socialist construction" was "very necessary" for the Vietnamese. An 11 November East Berlin domestic broadcast described the "economic cooperation" accords as including an agreement on the "GDR's material aid to the DRV and mutual trade and payments in 1975," and on "supplies within the framework of the solidarity aid of the mass organizations and the people of the Republic."

HUNGARIAN AID TO THE PRG On 4 November Budapest MTI reported that the Hungarian delegation, after arriving in Hanoi on 30 October, departed the next day for a three-day tour of the "liberated zone" in South Vietnam. Deputy Premier Borbandi held talks with PRG Vice President Nguyen Van Kiet, and on 1 November signed an "agreement on the Hungarian People's Republic's payment-free economic assistance to the PRGRSV" for 1975. VNA and Hanoi radio broadcast details of the visit and the "nonrefundable economic aid" on 5 November. Hungary, Poland, and Romania were not among Eastern European countries visited by NFLSV/PRG leader Nguyen Huu Tho during his recent month-long tour of communist states, in which economic aid agreements for 1975 were concluded.*

* Nguyen Huu Tho's tour of East Europe is discussed in the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 14-16.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 11 -

K O R E A

DPRK FOREIGN MINISTER INDICATES CHANGE IN NEGOTIATION TERMS

Speaking in Pyongyang at an 8 November meeting of North Korea's major reunification front organization, Foreign Minister Ho Tam, "authorized by the DPRK Government," suggested North Korea is willing to hold bilateral military talks with the South to discuss arrangements for "fulfilling the major provisions" of the present armistice agreement. Ho proposed a joint North-South military commission, which would replace the existing Military Armistice Commission. This marks a departure from Pyongyang's previous, longstanding insistence that a peace treaty with the South replace the present armistice agreement.* Ho was vague (perhaps purposely so) on the preconditions necessary before such talks could begin, but he did not seem to link these bilateral talks directly with prior withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South or with his proposal for holding a great national congress or consultative conference, his suggested forum for renewed political negotiations.

Ho reiterated the standard North Korean charge that U.S. troops are a source of tension and obstruct the peaceful reunification of Korea, but he did not accuse them of planning aggression against the North. Instead, he warned that the presence of U.S. forces might embolden the South to commit an "insane" act, thus embroiling the United States in a war which Ho implied it did not want. Like most high level DPRK initiatives in recent years, Ho's speech did not call for "immediate" withdrawal of U.S. forces, not stipulating a time frame at all other than to say U.S. forces should not remain "indefinitely." (Other statements at the front meeting in support of Ho's report did call for immediate U.S. withdrawal.) Ho denounced any attempt to keep U.S. forces in Korea under the U.S.-ROK defense treaty as a "swindle."

The DPRK proposal attempted to portray Pyongyang as flexible and reasonable in the face of unyielding hostility from ROK President Pak. Painting a gloomy picture of the current state of the dialog, Ho gave little hope for revitalization of the moribund North-South

* In March 1974 the DPRK proposed direct peace talks with the United States; in his speech Ho insisted that Washington respond to this proposal. For background see the TRENDS of 27 March 1974, pages 21-22.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 12 -

Coordinating Commission, which he said has become "meaningless." He claimed that Pak's 23 June 1973 speech advocating admission of two Koreas to the United Nations had "unilaterally sabotaged" the dialog and that Seoul's constant perfidy had marred the atmosphere of negotiations "beyond retrieval."

Ho strongly implied that the North's offer of further negotiations with the South hinges on Pak's replacement by an unnamed "new democratic figure." Ho did not make it clear whether both political and military talks, or only political talks, are linked to Pak's departure. Reviving pre-dialog rhetoric, Ho supported demands for Pak's "overthrow," a demand that has been muted for the past two years. Ho also gave equal, and unusual, attention to the possibility of Pak's "resignation".* With the Pak regime gone, Ho promised, North-South political negotiations, in the form of either a great national congress or a political consultative conference--standard North Korean alternatives to the present political talks--could be held "at once."

FORD TRIP Ho noted opposition in both South Korea and the United States to President Ford's planned trip to South Korea, calling it an "intolerable insult" to the Korean people. However, he avoided harsh, personal characterizations of the President, and in contrast to other statements at the meeting, did not call for cancellation of the trip. He did impute to the President a "sinister intention" to maintain U.S. "colonial domination" over the South by going to Seoul to "cheer up" Pak during a trying time for his regime. The KCNA English version of Ho's report, replaying selected passages, was noticeably softer in tone on the U.S. presence and on the President's trip than the original Korean broadcast by Pyongyang radio.

* Political Committee member Kim Tong-kyu in his speech supporting Ho's report went so far as to quote the South Korean people as demanding Pak "honorably relinquish" his office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 13 -

P R C - C A R I B B E A N

PEKING WELCOMES TRINIDAD GUEST, PRAISES GUYANA POLICIES

Peking, which has established diplomatic relations with three English-speaking Caribbean nations--Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago--since 1972, has just hosted the first Commonwealth Caribbean government head to visit the PRC. Peking might see greater possibilities for developing relationships with these newer, English-speaking Caribbean countries, many of which are not signatories to the Rio Pact or members of the OAS, than with the more traditional Latin countries whose policies usually endorse ties with the United States and whose communist parties are generally Soviet-oriented. NCNA reported that Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister Eric Williams was given a "rousing welcome" on his 5-11 November visit to the PRC, during which he had a "cordial and friendly" conversation with Mao Tse-tung and a similar meeting with Chou En-lai. PEOPLE'S DAILY editorially praised Williams' foreign policy of "independence, self-determination and nonalignment" and routinely referred to the Caribbean in terms of Third World struggles against "aggression, control and plunder" by the superpowers. The concluding press communique announced the exchange of "functional offices" in Port-of-Spain and Peking and noted the importance of mutual understanding and cooperation between Third World countries.

Peking has also had praise for the "independent" foreign policy of Guyana's Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, possibly with an eye to the fact that his most likely successor would be Cheddi Jagan of the Soviet-oriented People's Progressive Party. NCNA has given considerable attention to Burnham's efforts to nationalize his country's bauxite industry and create the International Bauxite Association (IBA), an OPEC-style cartel of producing states which held its first ministerial council meeting in Guyana 5-9 November. Prior to the meeting, NCNA described Burnham's efforts as "completely justified" and asserted that such policies would form a "rising tide, heavily battering the superpowers' regime of international exploitation and pillage." After the meeting failed to produce agreement on a unified bauxite pricing policy, NCNA reported the council communique as saying that some IBA members had been subjected to "pressure and sustained hostility" and that the council had decided that each member state should "take appropriate steps" toward safeguarding its own interests.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 14 -

CHINA

RED FLAG ARTICLES URGE DISCIPLINE, WARN OF FACTIONALISM

Articles in the November RED FLAG strongly pressing party leadership and discipline suggest that factional strife has become a serious problem for Peking. One such article, entitled "Strengthen the Centralized Leadership of the Party," bluntly warned that "no department, organization or individual is permitted to be independent of the party." The article, broadcast by Peking radio on 10 November, denounced a "small number" of party members for "quoting the party's policies, decisions, and instructions out of context or distorting them to suit their own needs." Prescribing a large dose of party authority as a cure for these failings, the article instructed local party leaders to "take the interests of the party as the only criteria for measuring their own speeches and actions." Party committees were told to heed opinions from lower-level organizations and from the masses only "if they are correct." The article strongly reaffirmed the party's central authority over all other organizations, proclaiming that local party committees are "the command headquarters which exercise leadership in everything in that area."

A second RED FLAG article also broadcast on 10 November discussed the relationship between unity and struggle, carefully noting the theoretical right of the masses to exercise supervision while implying that there were realistic limitations on mass criticism of leaders. The article warned cadres not to forget the "lesson" of the cultural revolution, when "capitalist roaders incited groups of people to fight against other groups and split the revolutionary ranks." Arguing that it is necessary to pay attention to "both struggle and unity," the article advised each cadre to correctly treat himself and the masses, "particularly those who criticized him." Cadres were told to improve themselves even if they "have made no mistakes" and never "retaliate against the masses."

Peking's resolve to prevent factionalism from weakening the party's control over the campaign was reflected in a TACHUNG DAILY editorial broadcast by Tsinan radio on 12 November. The editorial revealed that some party leaders in Shantung "show symptoms of bourgeois factionalism" and have tried "to weaken, even break away from, party leadership." Stressing the need to strengthen the centralized leadership of the party, the editorial spelled

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 15 -

out the relationship between "going against the tide," a revolutionary slogan endorsed at the 10th party congress, and observing party discipline. "Correctly going against the tide," the editorial argued, is in keeping with observing party discipline, as both are aimed at insuring implementation of Mao's policies. Noting that the party constitution adopted in August 1973 granted party members the right to "bypass the immediate leadership and report directly to higher levels," the article pointed up the need for greater party discipline, arguing that "we still must implement the party committee's directives and decisions before they are changed by the party committee." Cadres opposed to central party decisions were warned against refusing to implement them on the grounds that they "hold different views" and party committees were instructed to work for the interests of the majority, "not for the selfish interests of oneself or one's faction." The editorial bluntly announced that "all unprincipled factional struggles must be completely eliminated."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 16 -

NOTES

CAMBODIAN NATIONAL DAY: Cambodian Front and Chinese media have failed to originate any comment marking the 21st Cambodian National Day on 9 November, an omission at variance with highlevel statements on the occasion in the past. At the same time, a Cambodian "economic-financial" delegation led by Ieng Sary, "special adviser" to the RGNU deputy prime minister, has dropped from public view. The delegation, which arrived in Peking on the 3d, was last reported by NCNA when it met with the DPRK Ambassador on the 5th. On the previous day Ieng Sary had accompanied RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth to the Peking airport to meet Prince Sihanouk on his return from Algeria. Sihanouk subsequently remained out of public view until NCNA reported that he met with the visiting South Yemen Chairman in Peking on 13 November. In past years the Cambodian anniversary had occasioned an official RGNU statement, a PRC leaders' message, and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial that were publicized by both NCNA and Front media. Also, a well publicized Front turnout at a Peking reception, led by either Sihanouk or Penn Nouth, has marked the date every year since Sihanouk's ouster except for 1973, when both leaders were temporarily residing in Canton. By contrast, this year Peking has remained silent on the date and the insurgent news agency AKI has marked it only by reporting greetings messages from the DRV, PRC and other foreign leaders. Hanoi media duly publicized the DRV message, though there was no report of the usual NHAN DAN commentary on the date. The PRC message--as reported by AKI--and the DRV greetings voiced routine support for "head of state" Sihanouk and the Front's five points, while Peking pledged to give "allout assistance and support."

DPRK-SOVIET RELATIONS: North Korean treatment of the 57th anniversary of the Soviet October Revolution reflected an increasing chill in Pyongyang-Moscow relations. Korean representation at the customary Pyongyang anniversary meeting on 6 November and the Soviet ambassador's banquet the next day was reduced in rank from that of previous years, failing to include a full member of the Korean Workers Party Political Committee. Korean speakers at both functions, the DPRK leader messages, and the NODONG SINMUN anniversary editorial article failed to include the usual mentions of past Soviet aid. In addition, the available KCNA English summary of this year's greetings from the North's armed forces minister to his Soviet counterpart was noticeably cooler than the comparable summaries of past years. This year's NODONG SINMUN article reaffirmed Pyongyang's independent

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 17 -

stance vis-a-vis Moscow, calling Kim Il-song's "chuche" idea that emphasizes independence and self-reliance the "Marxist-Leninist guiding idea of our era" and noting that its conception had reflected the "new stage of development of the international communist movement." This year's anniversary comment did, however, include scattered references to the Soviet and Korean peoples' friendship and solidarity that had been omitted last year. This September, during DPRK National Day observances, Pyongyang had slighted Moscow when Kim met with a visiting Chinese delegation but failed to receive the equivalent Soviet group.

ARGENTINE STATE OF SIEGE: In its strongest criticism of the government since the death of Gen. Juan Peron on 1 July, the Argentine Communist Party (PCA) issued an official statement deploring the state of siege imposed by President Isabel Peron on 6 November. The PCA statement, as reported by PRENSA LATINA on the 8th, urged all sectors of the population to demand that the siege decree be revoked because it paved the way for a coup "by the ultraright and allies of the CIA." The PCA also questioned the "inexplicable" failure of the police to find "any trace" of the rightwing Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA), an obvious reference to the widely-held belief that the AAA has government support. The PCA, which usually speaks through the communist weekly NUESTRA PALABRA, generally has backed the Peronist regime since its return to power in April 1973, but since Gen. Peron's death has grown increasingly impatient with the government's inability to control terrorism and with the growth of rightwing strength within the cabinet. Thus on 23 October PRENSA LATINA reported NUESTRA PALABRA's criticism of the removal of liberal Economic Minister Jose Gelbard as a "disquieting" indication of the influence wielded in Argentina by "Yankee imperialism and the CIA." The USSR and Cuba are usually quick to pick up statements by the Soviet-oriented PCA, but Moscow, which is expanding relations with Argentina, has not yet reported the 7 October statement.

BELGRADE ON SINO-SOVIET TIES: Yugoslav reaction to the PRC's changed stand on a nonaggression treaty with the USSR in its October Revolution anniversary message to Moscow was decidedly more optimistic and somewhat more favorable toward Peking than its comment last year on Brezhnev's disclosure that Moscow had made similar proposals. Zagreb radio commentator Milika Sundic on the 8th and a Belgrade radio commentator on the 9th suggested enthusiastically that Peking's proposal could signal a "turning point" in Sino-Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 18 -

relations. Last year Sundic, in a 5 October 1973 comment, had asserted that relations between the two were so bad he saw "few reasons for anticipating any positive changes whatsoever." Sundic's comment on Brezhnev's disclosure had also aired criticism of Peking on the border issue in noting that one apparent objective of Moscow's initiative had been to discredit the "inaccuracy of Chinese accusations" against the Soviet Union. Belgrade comment on the current Peking step, on the other hand, avoided criticizing the PRC, perhaps reflecting Yugoslavia's increased contacts with the PRC and continued sensitivity toward Moscow following the Cominformist affair. Thus, Sundic claimed that "it has become obvious that China is pursuing a policy which--although the Soviet Union may dispute this--has no intention of aggravating relations with any country, including the Soviet Union."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- S 1 -

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

NEW MOSCOW IDEOLOGICAL DRIVE APPEARS TO UNDERCUT DETENTE FOES

One of the intriguing features of the new ideological campaign under way in the Soviet Union since early summer 1974 is that its main identified targets thus far have been outstanding stalwarts of ideological orthodoxy. This raises the strong possibility that in addition to its stated aims of stiffening Soviet resistance to the erosive effects of detente, the campaign is also aimed at protecting Brezhnev from potential charges by hard line elements that the detente policy courts ideological danger. The last big ideological campaign in 1968, in addition to ruthlessly purging liberals and turning the whole political atmosphere more reactionary, was also apparently used to undermine Brezhnev's personal rivals.

In contrast to the 1968 crackdown, this year's campaign is being conducted quietly, without noisy persecution of victims which might produce an unfavorable impression abroad. The theme of the new campaign stresses the notion that as detente proceeds, ideological struggle between East and West widens rather than diminishes, and a massive intensification of ideological work is necessary to prevent the penetration of foreign ideas and values. Although this idea was present in statements on detente policy from the beginning, it was apparently felt necessary to reiterate and reinforce it, in part no doubt to counter efforts by various philosophers, historians and economists to take advantage of relaxation to push for greater professional freedom in the social sciences.*

The present ideological campaign is based on two Central Committee decrees and a new collection of Brezhnev speeches on ideology, all published from late June to late August. The decrees criticize ideological shortcomings in organizations under the jurisdiction

* See the Supplementary Article "Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Sciences" in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974; the TRENDS of 24 April 1974, pages 10-13; the Supplementary Article "New Ally for Leader of Soviet Revisionist Historians" in the TRENDS of 1 May 1974; and the TRENDS Supplement "The Struggle for Change in the Soviet Social Sciences" of 29 May 1974.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- S 2 -

of some of the most outspoken champions of ideological orthodoxy--the Belorussian organization led by First Secretary P.M. Masherov and the Moscow city organization led by First Secretary V.V. Grishin and ideology secretary V.N. Yagodkin. Ironically, the logical targets for reproof--the outspoken philosophers, historians and economists who have been challenging party restraints--are not even hinted at in the decree.

DECREES ON IDEOLOGY Although the two Central Committee decrees are vague, their thrust can be discerned from the subsequent commentary on them. The first decree--"On the Work of Moscow's N.E. Bauman Higher Technical School and Saratov's N.G. Chernyshevskiy State University in Raising the Ideological-Theoretical Level of Teaching of Social Sciences"--did not directly stress the intensification of ideological struggle, but was interpreted in subsequent comment to carry that implication. According to the 24 June PRAVDA version of the decree, it complained that "criticism of modern bourgeois theories, reformism and revisionism" is "insufficiently sharp and convincing" and often fails to consider the "peculiarities of the present stage of ideological struggle." A report of a Moscow city party committee plenum on the decree, carried in the 2 July MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, declared that raising the level of communist education of youth was required because of the "sharpening of the ideological struggle in the international arena." In a further comment, a 5 July PRAVDA editorial defined the decree as a call for all higher educational institutions to improve ideological indoctrination of students. Another PRAVDA editorial on 17 July also called for ideological hardening of the students, and apparently anticipating the theme of the second decree, stated that "at the present stage of communist construction, under conditions of sharp ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism, further raising the level of ideological and moral education of the Soviet people acquires first-rank importance."

The second decree--"On the Work of Choosing and Training Ideological Cadres in the Party Organization of Belorussia"--raised the theme more directly. PRAVDA's 31 August version stated that simultaneously with the strengthening of peaceful coexistence, "the ideological struggle is becoming wider and more complex and the significance of ideological work and the whole party's attention to it is growing immeasurably" and that this places "higher demands" on ideological workers. This theme was repeated in PRAVDA editorials on 3, 17, 19 and 23 September and 10 October. The timing and scale of the campaign can be judged by the fact that PRAVDA, which had virtually

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- S 3 -

ignored ideology in its editorials during the first half of the year, has devoted seven editorials to ideological tightening up since early July. By October the decree on Belorussia was being discussed at local meetings across the country and an October KOMMUNIST editorial stated that every oblast was slated to hold such a meeting by the end of the year.

CONSERVATIVES AS TARGETS Ironically, these two decrees were aimed at ideologically conservative party organizations which have consistently stressed the need for ideological vigilance. For instance, at an April Belorussian plenum on ideology, republic first secretary Masherov declared:

Under conditions of detente, class struggle on the world arena does not fade, but on the contrary deepens and widens. It embraces both the sphere of politics and the sphere of economics, and appears with special sharpness in ideology.

According to the 30 April 1974 SOVIET BELORUSSIA account, he condemned the defensiveness of Soviet ideologists and called upon social scientists, writers and artists to participate in the "growing confrontation of ideas." The Belorussians have constantly stressed ideological indoctrination, and their April 1974 plenum was the first such meeting in the country devoted to ideological tightening up.

Much the same can be said for the Moscow city party organization. In a September 1973 PARTY LIFE article on young specialists, Moscow city ideology secretary Yagodkin declared that peaceful coexistence "in no way means any weakening of the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism or any dulling of vigilance toward any ideological sallies of imperialism." In a February 1974 KOMMUNIST article on ideological work he wrote that under peaceful coexistence contacts will widen, which means that there will be greater opportunity for penetration of hostile ideas and, hence, that the ideological struggle will intensify. The Moscow organization and Yagodkin, in particular, have frequently intervened in Moscow educational establishments to attack liberals and innovators and to insist on more stress on ideology by philosophers, historians and economists.

Nevertheless, the August decree held up the Belorussians as a bad example for laxity in ideological work. At a 13 September Belorussian aktiv meeting to discuss the decree, Masherov admitted that the CPSU Secretariat had judged as inadequate his efforts at tightening

CONFIDENTIAL

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- S 4 -

up.* Similarly, the decree on the Bauman school implicitly rebuked Yagodkin and the Moscow city party committee. In his September 1973 PARTY LIFE article on ideological training of young specialists, Yagodkin had used precisely that school as his prime positive example of such work in Moscow, describing its work in detail and declaring that the school was "successfully implementing measures to improve the ideological orientation in teaching technical disciplines and raising the role of professors and teachers of special courses in teaching students a communist world view."

On 1 July the Moscow city party committee held a special plenum to discuss the Bauman decree and the improvement of communist education of the youth; First Secretary Grishin himself delivered the report on this rebuke to his organization. The 2 July MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA account noted that the shortcomings pointed out in the decree apply to "a whole series of Moscow higher educational institutions," and the plenum's decree, printed in the 5 July MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, acknowledged that Moscow's training of youth was not good enough. As indicated in a November ECONOMIC GAZETTE article by a Yagodkin subordinate, the Moscow organization reacted to the decree by ordering all social science departments in Moscow to hold party meetings to evaluate each teacher's work in the light of the decree and by requiring all social science teachers to undergo retraining in the next two to three years. Since July the Moscow organization has held several meetings to discuss ideological shortcomings and ways to improve ideological work, and to hear lectures on ideological work from the Central Committee's Agitprop leaders.

The fact that some leading hardliners themselves are being held up as negative examples in the current campaign against ideological erosion suggests complex political motivations behind the decrees. However, it is not unprecedented: the most prominent official removed in the 1968 crackdown ironically turned out to be the neo-Stalinist Komsomol First Secretary S.P. Pavlov. After Brezhnev had announced the ideological crackdown in his 29 March Moscow city party conference speech, the Central Committee in early May adopted a decree on the Krasnoyarsk party organization exposing shortcomings in the Komsomol's ideological work. At a June 1968 Komsomol Central Committee plenum on this decree, Pavlov was removed as Komsomol first secretary, receiving the minor post of chairman of the Union of Sports Societies and Organizations.

* See the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 24-26.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- S 5 -

Pavlov was a protege of Brezhnev's rival Shelepin, and his removal had the effect of destroying Shelepin's base in the Komsomol. Similarly, Masherov has been no protege of Brezhnev, and he and his predecessor and onetime patron Mazurov have sometimes appeared to outflank Brezhnev on the left with their stress on ideological orthodoxy and shortchanging of detente. Yagodkin has served as spokesman for the hardline wing, but his relationship to Brezhnev is not clear.

The Central Committee's propaganda section, and especially its new first deputy head G.L. Smirnov, have played an unusually visible role in the rebukes to the Belorussian and Moscow organizations. As deputy head of Agitprop, Smirnov spoke on current ideological problems at the April Belorussian ideology plenum and also apparently headed the investigation of Belorussia's ideological work which resulted in the rebuke to that republic. He also attended the 1 July Moscow city party committee plenum which discussed the shortcomings pointed out by the Bauman decree. Shortly thereafter he was promoted to first deputy head of Agitprop, becoming its senior official in the apparent absence of any section chief. Since then, he and Agitprop deputy heads M.V. Gramov and V.A. Medvedev have delivered lectures on current propaganda tasks to several Moscow city organization meetings.

BREZHNEV BOOK At roughly the same time as the publication of the new decrees, PRAVDA on 17 July announced publication of a new collection of Brezhnev speeches and articles from 1964 to 1974 entitled "On Communist Education of the Workers." Previously collections of Brezhnev's pronouncements on agriculture, youth, party organization, and foreign affairs had been published, the collections lacking only a volume on ideology to match the range of subjects covered by Khrushchev's publications and to give him the status of an ideological authority.* Although the book is not yet available, recent reviews suggest that it is designed to play a key role in the crackdown and that it has some unusual and perhaps controversial features.

A review in a September AGITATOR stated that some of the material in the book is being published for the first time, specifying excerpts from Brezhnev speeches at the September 1965, April 1968 and December 1968 plenums. There is only one precedent for the publication of previously secret plenum speeches--the excerpts from

* For comparison of the Brezhnev and Khrushchev books, see the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 18-21.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
TRENDS
13 NOVEMBER 1974

- S 6 -

Brezhnev's December 1973 plenum speech in a collection of Brezhnev's speeches on agriculture, printed in February 1974. Those excerpts were quite revealing, and the decision to publish them appears to have aroused contention.* AGITATOR indicated that the head of the Central Committee's general section, K.U. Chernenko, an old Brezhnev crony, was responsible for the volume on ideology. Likewise, the apparently controversial agricultural collection was issued under the supervision of longtime Brezhnev assistant G.E. Tsukanov.

AGITATOR's reference to the September 1965 plenum speech is puzzling, since the speech was published at the time of the plenum and in Brezhnev's general collection of speeches. The new collection may contain additional unpublished parts of the speech. The 9 December 1968 plenum speech will be completely new, since not even the subject of that speech has ever been revealed. But the most interesting may be the April 1968 plenum speech, since that concentrated on combatting revisionism at home and abroad and helped kick off the 1968 crackdown. Although Brezhnev's comments at that plenum were not published, the plenum's decree printed in the 11 April 1968 PRAVDA clearly revealed the thrust of his remarks, declaring that the current situation was "characterized by a sharp exacerbation of the ideological war between capitalism and socialism" and therefore "intensification of all ideological activity of the party acquires special significance and is one of the main duties of all party organizations." Since these excerpts are being made public as part of the current ideological campaign, they may cast light on the motivations of this campaign.

That the new book is connected with the current campaign is indicated in reviews in an October PARTY LIFE and the 16 August PRAVDA, which declared that it analyzes the "peculiarities of ideological struggle under conditions of detente" and outlines ways to improve the fight against bourgeois and revisionist ideology. At the same time, the reviews appear to differ in their interpretation of the thrust of Brezhnev's speeches. An October PARTY LIFE editorial review gave the book a hardline slant, stressing the book's emphasis on sharp ideological struggle, stating that successes in peaceful coexistence "in no way mean it is possible to weaken the ideological struggle" and citing Brezhnev's recent statement in a July Warsaw speech that with the present intensification of ideological war, Soviet ideology must become more aggressive in

* See the Supplementary Article "Contention Over Party Role in Leading Soviet Economy" in the TRENDS of 14 August 1974.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- S 7 -

rebuffing hostile ideas. In contrast, a 9 August KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editorial review virtually ignored ideological struggle, and an August KOMMUNIST editorial review also placed no particular stress on these features of the book, although it did note that foreign foes were trying to use the international exchange of ideas and information to undermine the Soviet system.

Most at variance with PARTY LIFE's negative approach was the 16 August PRAVDA editorial review. While noting that the book analyzed the ideological struggle under conditions of detente, it approvingly noted the widening of international contacts and exchanges and quoted Brezhnev's optimistic 15 August 1973 Alma-Ata statement welcoming broader contacts with the West. The review then concluded that "the main orientation of the CPSU's ideological activity in the international arena is the wide dissemination of the truth about the achievements of the Soviet people"

The contrasting reviews appear to reflect a deep-seated cleavage within the regime over how to adjust to detente. The hardliners view it as a danger, the liberals, as an opportunity. Brezhnev himself had given ammunition to the liberals with his 15 August 1973 statement:

We are confident of the correctness of our path and our Marxist-Leninist ideology and do not doubt that the widening of contacts, exchange of spiritual values and information, and development of ties between the public of different countries which is natural under conditions of detente will serve well the spreading of the truth about socialism and the winning over of more and more adherents to the side of the ideas of scientific communism.

The appeal of this statement to liberal circles was demonstrated when the unorthodox journal QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY used it in its January editorial to support its campaign against conservatives' demands for a crackdown on new ideas.* Brezhnev himself has not repeated this statement, few others have picked it up, and the new Central Committee decrees clearly reflect a more negative approach.

* See the Supplementary Article "Challenge to Party Domination of the Soviet Social Sciences," pages S2-S3, in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 NOVEMBER 1974

- 1 -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 4 - 10 NOVEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2319 items)</u>			<u>Peking (951 items)</u>		
October Revolution Anniversary	(2%)	36%	Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(9%)	10%
[Gromyko, Podgorny, Grechko Speeches]	(--)	12%]	Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Williams in PRC	(--)	9%*
China	(5%)	4%	Indochina	(6%)	8%
Portuguese State Minister Cunhal in USSR	(3%)	3%	[Vietnam	(5%)	3%]
[Joint Communique]	(--)	2%]	[RGNUC Economic, Financial Delegation in PRC]	(--)	3%]
CPSU Politburo "Approval" of European CP Meeting	(--)	3%	UNGA Session	(9%)	6%
			World Food Conference, Rome	(--)	3%
			USSR	(1%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Williams.